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PREEMPTION BY PREAMBLE: FEDERAL AGENCIES
AND THE FEDERALIZATION OF TORT LAW
Catherine M. Sharkey*
INTRODUCTION
In the preamble to its January 2006 prescription drug labeling rule,
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) asserted that "FDA ap-
proval of labeling under the act .. preempts conflicting or contrary
State law."' The latest rule handed down by the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSC)-strengthening the requirements for bed-
ding mattresses' ability to withstand fires caused by open flames, such
as candles, matches, and lighters-includes a sweeping preamble stat-
ing that the new federal standard preempts "inconsistent state stan-
dards and requirements, whether in the form of positive enactments
or court created requirements."' And, if the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) has its way, a new safety standard
for roofs on sport-utility vehicles will include language immunizing
auto manufacturers from state tort lawsuits over defective roofs if
their autos meet federal safety standards.3 Dubbed "silent tort re-
form,"4 these preemption preambles may be only the tip of the ice-
berg-a harbinger of a future where federal agency regulations come
* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
(Spring 2007). I presented earlier versions of this Article at the Twelfth Annual Clifford Sympo-
sium at DePaul University College of Law, at law faculty workshops at Chicago-Kent, Iowa, and
Tel Aviv Universities, and at a panel at the 2006 Federalist Society National Convention, where
participants offered helpful comments. I am especially grateful to Robert Rabin for an insightful
oral commentary at the Clifford Symposium. For additional comments and criticisms, I thank
Michael Dorf, Jared Goldstein, Roderick Hills, Samuel Issacharoff, Nina Mendelson, Gillian
Metzger, Henry Monaghan, Theodore Ruger, Daniel Schweitzer, Peter Strauss, John Witt, and
Stephen Wood. Rodman Forter, Aaron Leiderman, and Jaime Sneider provided excellent re-
search assistance.
1. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Bio-
logical Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (effective June 30, 2006) (to be codified
at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601).
2. Final Rule: Standard for the Flammability (Open-Flame) of Mattress Sets, 71 Fed. Reg.
13,472, 13,496 (Mar. 15, 2006) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1633).
3. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance, 70 Fed. Reg. 49,223,
49,247-48 (proposed Aug. 23, 2005) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
4. Stephen Labaton, "Silent Tort Reform" Is Overriding States' Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,
2006, at C5 ("Supporters and detractors call it the 'silent tort reform' movement, and it has
quietly and quickly been gaining ground."); see also Kenneth M. Suggs, Warped Washington, 42
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armed with directives that displace competing or conflicting state reg-
ulations or common law as a matter of course.5
Federal agency momentum towards increased preemption-evi-
denced by clear statements in the preambles of issued regulations-
fits the broader pattern of what Professor Samuel Issacharoff and I
have termed "backdoor federalization."' 6 Just as our prior account
complicated the characterization of the Rehnquist Court as a staunch
ally of states' rights, the agency account I present here also tempers
the conventional view.7 In the "tale of three agencies" that follows, I
place the recent aggressive stances adopted by the CPSC, the
NHTSA, and the FDA in sharp relief against a historical backdrop of
more mixed (and often muted) preemption positions.
Next, analyzing what is at stake in the agency preemption debate, I
highlight a discernible trend-both in the U.S. Supreme Court and in
lower courts-towards deference to agency preemption determina-
tions. Given the momentum in this direction, I expose a potentially
troubling asymmetry: courts appear to grant agencies fairly expansive
discretion to interpret or declare the preemptive scope of the regula-
tions they promulgate, 8 but when it comes to inferring private rights of
TRIAL, Mar. 2006, at 9 ("The other new attack on safety and responsibility is coming from ad-
ministrative agencies-controlled, of course, by the White House.").
5. Lest this seem hyperbolic, consider this statement by Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sioner Thomas Moore:
To some, this new preemption language may not seem of much consequence in the
mattress context, but it (or something very like it) will be inserted in every new regula-
tion the Commission issues. The consumer's right to sue a manufacturer, potentially
any manufacturer of a regulated consumer product, for injuries from that product, may
be seriously curtailed. That surely is not without consequence.
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, Statement of the Honorable Thomas H. Moore on
the Final Rule and Preamble for the Flammability (Open-Flame) of Mattress Sets (Feb. 16,
2006), http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtml06/06091.html [hereinafter CPSC Commis-
sioner Moore Statement on the Final Rule and Preamble].
6. Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV.
1353 (2006). Our collaborative project offered a positive, analytic account of the momentum
towards the federalization of substantive law and forum-as seen by the Rehnquist Court's opin-
ions regarding preemption and federal question subject-matter jurisdiction, and indirectly by its
punitive damages jurisprudence. By detailing its jurisprudence in these areas, we portrayed the
Court as a willing partner of Congress in providing federal oversight of state interference with
the national market. To the extent our project was descriptive of the general momentum to-
wards federalization, the recent federal agency actions essentially confirm our account. To the
extent that our account was predictive in the sense that broad product markets increasingly will
tend to be regulated nationally, not locally, we seem to be on equally sure footing.
7. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Note, The Unwarranted Regulatory Preemption of Predatory
Lending Laws, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2274, 2292-93 (2004) ("[T]he Rehnquist Court's revitalization
of federalism principles has rendered judicial deference to preemption 'by administrative fiat'
increasingly less likely ...." (citations omitted)).
8. The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 126 S. Ct. 2900
(2006), argued Nov. 29, 2006, may provide the Court an opportunity to clarify this area, but it
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action under those same regulations, the agencies' hands are tied by
judicial tether. Justice Antonin Scalia has colorfully remarked that
agencies cannot create causes of action: "Agencies may play the sor-
cerer's apprentice but not the sorcerer himself."9 Why can an agency
play the role of the sorcerer in the context of preemption, but must
remain a lowly apprentice with respect to implied rights of action? At
the extreme, a disconcerting scenario emerges, whereby aggressive
regulatory preemption, combined with a renewed vigor for eviscerat-
ing federal private causes of action, could lead to a nearly complete
substitution of public for private enforcement of the law.
Even if the inexorable momentum towards federalization continues,
agencies and courts may have means at their disposal to harness this
development in service of transparency and, more ambitiously, a new
era of accountability. Agencies themselves might foster federalism
values by forcing Congress to confront the preemption question it has
repeatedly dodged when it regulates products. Alternatively, agencies
might emerge as effective representatives of state interests, the situs
for a rich, deliberative dialogue regarding the interplay of state law
and federal regulatory schemes. Courts might condition deference to
agency interpretations of the preemptive scope of regulations on com-
pliance with various congressional and executive measures designed
to increase the public participation of states, the legislature, and
outside political groups. Consultation mandates, "federalism impact
statements,"'10 or even notice-and-comment periods could be required
for all preemption statements. Such information-forcing reforms
would, at a bare minimum, shed light on what has hitherto been an all-
too-quiet, backdoor movement in need of further scrutiny and debate.
II. FEDERALIZING AGENTS: A TALE OF THREE AGENCIES
With the issuance of a series of controversial preambles, federal
agencies have recently thrust themselves into the preemption spot-
light. What follows is an account of the forays into the preemption
debate by three agencies (CPSC, NHTSA, FDA), which I examine in
the context of the broader framework of the "backdoor federaliza-
may be just as likely that the Court instead focuses on the particularities of the National Banking
Act. See infra Part III.A.
9. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001).
10. "Federalism implications" include federal actions that "have substantial direct effects on
the States, on the relationship between the National Government and the States, or on the distri-
bution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government." Requirements on
Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and Biologics; Requirements for
Prescription Drug Product Labels, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,082, 81,103 (proposed Dec. 22, 2000) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201).
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tion" of products liability. I begin with the relatively obscure CPSC. I
then turn briefly to the NHTSA and the FDA, which are not only
well-known administrative agencies, but ones whose regulations have
been implicated in major preemption decisions before the Supreme
Court.
A. Consumer Product Safety Commission
Created as an independent federal regulatory agency in 1972 by the
Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) 11 "to protect the public against
unreasonable risks of injuries associated with consumer products, 12
the CPSC was conceived as a "super-agency" with "authority to regu-
late all food, drugs, and common household products.' 3 The CPSA
was "the first legislation since the ... New Deal to create an indepen-
dent commission for the purpose of imposing federal regulation on an
established area of commercial activity.' a4 Against a patchwork of
piecemeal federal product safety regulations, industry self-regulation,
common-law standards and remedies, and state and local agency regu-
lations, Congress perceived the need for a federal agency to oversee
the increasingly national product market.' 5 The CPSC emphasizes its
role in creating national standards: "[O]ur work ensures a uniform
level of safety for the-nation's families. Similarly, our product safety
work and safety guidance provide businesses with a national level
playing-field for domestic and imported consumer products. '16
At the time of its creation, the CPSC was expected to be a beacon
of product safety, with wide discretion to establish mandatory safety
standards, including requirements for product performance, design,
labeling, warnings, and instructions. 17 With jurisdiction over more
than 15,000 types of consumer products, the CPSC's role was (and
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084 (2000).
12. Id. § 2051(b).
13. S. REP. No. 92-835, at 1 (1972), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4573, 4574. This new
"super-agency" was to exercise areas of regulatory control previously under the authority of the
FDA, Center for Disease Control, Department of Commerce, Federal Trade Commission, and
Department of Agriculture. See Chad D. Emerson, The Continuing Showdown over Who
Should Regulate Amusement Attraction Safety: A Critical Analysis of Why Fixed-Site Amusement
Attraction Safety Should Remain State-Governed, 28 SETON HALL LEGIs. J. 1, 18 (2003).
14. Antonin Scalia & Frank Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety
Act, 20 UCLA L. REV. 899, 899 (1973).
15. See id. at 900-01.
16. U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, 2007 PERFORMANCE BUDGET REQUEST: SAV-
ING LIVES AND KEEPING FAMILIES SAFE iV (2006), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/
pubs/reports/2007plan.pdf [hereinafter CPSC, 2007 PERFORMANCE BUDGET REQUEST].
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (authorizing the CPSC to set mandatory performance and labeling
requirements); see also Geraint G. Howells, The Relationship Between Product Liability and
Product Safety-Understanding a Necessary Element in European Product Liability Through a
230 [Vol. 56:227
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remains) to "identify and assess hazards, [and then] use a wide range
of tools to address them: the voluntary standards process; consumer
information; safety guidelines; cooperative product recalls and correc-
tive actions; and, as a last resort, mandatory rulemaking and litiga-
tion."1 8 But with the onset of the Reagan-era deregulatory thrust, 19
the CPSC shifted gears away from mandatory regulations towards vol-
untary standards.20 The rhetoric of the CPSC persists in full force to-
day: "The CPSC's work to ensure the safety of consumer products-
such as toys, cribs, power tools, cigarette lighters, and household
chemicals-contributed significantly to the 30 percent decline in the
rate of deaths and injuries associated with consumer products over the
past 30 years."'21 But its influence on the product safety landscape in
the United States has certainly waned.22
Given this background, the flammability standard for mattresses re-
cently promulgated by the CPSC23  is noteworthy because it is
mandatory.24 It is, moreover, the first "major" regulation passed by
Comparison with the U.S. Position, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 305, 309 (2000) (describing the CPSC's
original mandate).
18. CPSC, 2007 PERFORMANCE BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 16, at iv. Notwithstanding the
CPSC's sweeping language regarding its jurisdiction, a wide array of products falls outside its
purview: automobiles and other on-road vehicles, tires, boats, alcohol, tobacco, firearms, food,
drugs, cosmetics, pesticides, and medical devices produced by any manufacturer, retailer, im-
porter, and distributor of consumer products, regardless of their size. Nor does its jurisdiction
include false advertising, fraud, or poor product quality unrelated to safety. See U.S. Consumer
Product Safety Commission, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.cpsc.gov/about/faq.html
(last visited Jan. 10, 2007).
19. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189,
1318-19 (1986) ("[T]he Reagan administration appeared to pursue a broader-based de facto
deregulation policy by appointing unsympathetic agency administrators and proposing drastic
budget cuts in regulatory programs untainted by congressional disapproval .... [This] might
suggest a far more ambitious ideological aim, namely, to reassess the need for regulatory institu-
tions as a mechanism for policing the market." (citing GEORGE C. EADS & MICHAEL Fix, RE-
LIEF OR REFORM?: REAGAN'S REGULATORY DILEMMA 139-62 (1983)).
20. Howells, supra note 17, at 310 ("[Tjhe U.S. system has forgone mandatory regulations and
is left to rely upon free standing voluntary standards."). The revised CPSA reflects this shift in
regulatory approach. The Act was amended in 1981 to permit mandatory standards only where
compliance with voluntary standards would be unlikely "to result in the elimination or adequate
reduction of the risk of injury." Id. at 309 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2058(f)(3)(D) (1994 & Supp. IV
1998)).
21. Press Release, CPSC, CPSC Signs Cooperative Agreement with Chinese Government to
Improve Safety of U.S. Imports (Apr. 21, 2004), http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtml04/
04124.html.
22. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, The Politics of Tort Reform, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 709, 712 (1992)
("The present patchwork [regulatory] system does fairly well in some areas, such as food and
drug regulation, and dismally in others; witness the twenty year track record of the Consumer
Product Safety Commission.").
23. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
24. The CPSC currently "works on eight to fourteen mandatory standards per year and forty
to fifty voluntary standards." Howells, supra note 17, at 310.
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the CPSC in its history.25 But above all, what has attracted atten-
tion-and criticism-is the section of the Rule's preamble that reads
as follows: "The Commission intends and expects that the new mat-
tress flammability standard will preempt inconsistent state standards
and requirements, whether in the form of positive enactments or court
created requirements. ' 26 By making clear that "requirements" in-
clude not only positive statutory or regulatory provisions but also
court-imposed liability rules, the CPSC weighed in on an issue that
has bedeviled courts, including the Supreme Court.27  To justify its
action, the CPSC once again highlighted its interest in promoting uni-
form, federal standards:
State requirements intended to reduce the risk of mattress fire, no
matter how well intentioned, have the potential to undercut the
Commission's uniform national flammability standard, create im-
pediments for manufacturers whose mattress products enter the
stream of interstate commerce, establish requirements that make
dual state and federal compliance physically impossible, and cause
25. A "major" rule is defined as "one that has more than a $100 million annual impact on the
economy." Press Release, CPSC, CPSC Approves New Flammability Standard for Mattresses
(Feb. 16, 2006), http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtml06/06091.html. The CPSC estimates
that an average of 270 lives will be saved and 1330 injuries will be prevented annually once the
standard is fully effective. Id.
26. Final Rule: Standard for the Flammability (Open-Flame) of Mattress Sets, 71 Fed. Reg.
13,472, 13,496 (Mar. 15, 2006) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1633).
27. Compare, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992) ("The phrase 'no
requirement or prohibition' sweeps broadly and suggests no distinction between positive enact-
ments and common law; to the contrary, those words easily encompass obligations that take the
form of common-law rules." (alteration omitted)), with, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C.,
544 U.S. 431, 443 (2005) ("An occurrence that merely motivates an optional decision does not
qualify as a requirement. The Court of Appeals was therefore quite wrong when it assumed that
any event, such as a jury verdict, that might 'induce' a pesticide manufacturer to change its label
should be viewed as a requirement.").
As is fairly typical, the preemption provision contained in the Flammable Fabrics Act, the
statute invoked by the preamble as authority, uses the terms "standard" and "regulation" with-
out being explicit as to the fate of common-law remedies:
[W]henever a flammability standard or other regulation for a fabric . . .is in effect
under this [Act], no State . . . may establish or continue in effect a flammability stan-
dard or other regulation for such fabric . . . if the standard or other regulation is de-
signed to protect against the same risk of occurrence of fire with respect to which the
standard or other regulation under this [Act] is in effect unless the State... standard or
other regulation is identical to the Federal standard or other regulation.
15 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (2000). This language parallels the preemption provision included within the
CPSA. Id. § 2075(a) ("[N]o State or political subdivision of a State [may establish] ...any
provision of a safety standard or regulation which ... [is] designed to deal with the same risk of
injury associated with such consumer product, unless such requirements are identical to the re-
quirements of the Federal standard.").
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confusion among consumers seeking to understand differing state
and federal mattress fire requirements. 2 8
The inclusion of a preemption provision in the preamble statement
was unprecedented: "[It] was the first instance in the agency's 33-year
history of the commission's voting to limit the ability of consumers to
bring cases in state courts. ' '29 And it has sparked controversy, both
internally and with outside critics. From within, one of the CPSC's
Commissioners has lamented the sacrifice of the value of experimen-
tation: "States are often pioneers in consumer protection, providing
the impetus for new or improved federal regulation and California is
usually in the forefront on consumer issues."' 30 Moreover, the same
Commissioner has expressed doubt in the CPSC's ability to create
proper liability standards: "If we have gotten this standard right, then
[lawsuits] against manufacturers should be a rarity and prevailing ones
even less common. But if we have gotten it wrong, the fastest way we
will find out is through people bringing lawsuits that challenge our
conclusions."' 3' Senator Daniel Inouye has echoed the concern about
the ossification of safety standards:
I would hazard to guess that after this rule is finalized, the issue of
home fire safety may not be addressed for several more decades,
while science and the ability to make mattresses even safer will con-
tinue to evolve. Removing a significant incentive for industries to
improve outside of meeting the federal standard may have a chilling
effect on industries integrating new safety technology into their
products. 32
B. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
The NHTSA is a more familiar and more active federal regulatory
agency. 33 Located within the Department of Transportation (DOT),
28. Final Rule: Standard for the Flammability (Open-Flame) of Mattress Sets, 71 Fed. Reg. at
13,496. The CPSC invoked its authority under the Flammable Fabrics Act. See supra note 27.
29. Labaton, supra note 4.
30. CPSC Commissioner Moore Statement on the Final Rule and Preamble, supra note 5. In
this particular instance regarding the flammability standard, Commissioner Moore acknowl-
edged the contribution of California's Bureau of Home Furnishings and Thermal Insulation. See
id.; see also PREEMPTION ALERT (PIRG), Mar. 2006, at 1 [hereinafter PREEMPTION ALERT],
available at www.uspirg.org/html/preemptionalert/march06.pdf ("States have long been the labo-
ratories for innovative public policy. Over the last three decades, states have become more
active in passing strong laws to protect the environment and consumers.").
31. CPSC Commissioner Moore Statement on the Final Rule and Preamble, supra note 5.
32. PREEMPTION ALERT, supra note 30, at 2-3 (quoting Letter from Senator Inouye to CPSC
Chairman Hal Stratton (Feb. 13, 2006)).
33. For a comprehensive descriptive and normative account of the development of the
NHTSA's regulatory policy over the first two decades of its existence, see Jerry L. Mashaw &
David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON
REG. 257 (1987).
2007]
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with over 600 employees and an annual budget exceeding $400 mil-
lion, the "NHTSA's stated mission is to 'save lives, prevent injuries
and reduce traffic-related health care and other economic costs.' 34
A NHTSA regulation was front and center in Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co., 3 5 a pivotal preemption case before the Supreme
Court. The Court was asked to decide whether Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard 208 (FMVSS 208), promulgated under the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (VSA), preempted a state com-
mon-law tort action against a defendant auto manufacturer. 36 The
VSA is in some sense a quintessential example of the contradictory
signals sent by Congress. 37 Its preemption clause provides that "no
State . . . shall have any authority . . . to establish . . . any safety
standard ... which is not identical to the Federal standard. '38 Yet the
accompanying "savings clause" reads as follows: "Compliance with
any Federal motor vehicle safety standard . . . does not exempt any
person from any liability under common law." 39
The state tort action was premised on the manufacturer's negligence
in failing to equip its cars with certain passive restraints, including
airbags.40 The Court held that the regulation preempted state com-
mon-law tort actions premised on the failure to provide state-of-the-
34. Kevin M. McDonald, Shifting out of Neutral: A New Approach to Global Road Safety, 38
VANE. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 743, 773-74 (2005) (quoting Long Range Strategic Planning, 69 Fed.
Reg. 39,542, 39,543 (June 30, 2004)). McDonald, an attorney for Volkswagen of America, fur-
ther noted that "[a]s of December 2004, NHTSA had eighty-four active rulemaking proceed-
ings." Id. at 778 (citing Harry Stoffer, No Longer a Rule for Every Problem: NHTSA Focuses on
Fewer, Broader Areas, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Dec. 6, 2004, at 4)).
Professor Jerry Mashaw and Attorney David Harfst document a major paradigm shift that
pre-dates the Reagan Administration's deregulatory thrust:
Established as a rulemaking agency to force the technology of automobile safety de-
sign, NHTSA indeed functioned in a rulemaking mode from roughly its inception in
1966 until about 1974.... Since the mid-1970's, NHTSA has instead concentrated on
its alternative statutory power to force the recall of motor vehicles that contain "de-
fects" related to safety performance.
Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 33, at 263. They remark upon the parallel to the CPSC. Id. at
310-11 ("Like NHTSA, the CPSC's rulemaking power has atrophied while its primary regula-
tory activity has become product recalls.").
35. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
36. Id. at 864-65.
37. Indeed, "Congress demonstrates its capacity for creating ambiguity in the preemption
area." Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2058 (2000)
[hereinafter Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance]; accord Robert L. Rabin, Federalism
and the Tort System, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 28 (1997) ("To say that the Court's signals in the
preemption area have been indistinct regarding the appropriate degree of deference to be af-
forded federalism concerns would be a major understatement.").
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988), amended by 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (1994).
39. Id. § 1397(k).
40. Geier, 529 U.S. at 865.
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art passenger protection, reasoning that, absent preemption, "state
law could impose legal duties that would conflict directly with federal
regulatory mandates."'41 The regulatory standard "deliberately pro-
vided the manufacturer with a range of choices among different pas-
sive restraint devices," 42 and state law "would have presented an
obstacle to the variety and mix of devices that the federal regulation
sought. 43
In that case, neither Congress nor the Secretary of Transportation
had explicitly made this preemption judgment by statute or regula-
tion. But according to the Court, "[t]he failure of the Federal Register
to address pre-emption explicitly [was] not determinative. 4 4 The So-
licitor General, moreover, argued that the NHTSA's promulgation of
FMVSS 208 embodied an affirmative "policy judgment that safety
would best be promoted if manufacturers installed alternative protec-
tion systems in their fleets rather than one particular system in every
car."4 5 The Court "place[d] some weight '4 6 on the agency's interpre-
tation: "We have no reason to suspect that the Solicitor General's
representation of DOT's views reflects anything other than 'the
agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter.'" 47
Its pro-preemption position in Geier notwithstanding, it seems fair
to conclude that the NHTSA has not been particularly aggressive in
asserting the preemptive force of its enactments. For example, when
state officials in Massachusetts and New York asked for an advisory
opinion as to whether their respective defect notification programs
were preempted by the VSA, the NHTSA concluded that they were
not preempted because Congress did not intend to occupy the field of
41. Id. at 871. More precisely, the Court held that the suit was not expressly preempted by the
Act; but under implied conflict preemption principles, the Court found that because the suit was
based on requiring airbags, it conflicted with the regulation. Id. at 869, 874.
42. Id. at 875.
43. Id. at 881. In promulgating FMVSS 208, the NHTSA went through a detailed analysis of
what an "airbag only" standard would accomplish and what degrees of compliance would be
achieved. It then determined that a gradual approach, one that utilized a "mix" of safety de-
vices, was the preferable course. See id. at 874-75.
44. Geier, 529 U.S. at 884.
45. Id. at 881 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at
*25, Geier, 529 U.S. 861 (No. 98-1811), 1999 WL 1045115 [hereinafter United States Geier
Brief]).
46. Id. at 883 ("We place some weight upon DOT's interpretation of FMVSS 208's objectives
and its conclusion, as set forth in the Government's brief, that a tort suit such as this one would
'stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution' of those objectives." (alterations in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States Geier Brief, supra note 45,
at *25-26)).
47. Id. at 884 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)).
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motor vehicle defect notification.48 Moreover, because it would be
possible to comply with state law without violating the federal law,
and the state law did not frustrate the purpose of the federal regula-
tory regime, the NHTSA concluded that there was no conflict or ob-
stacle preemption. 49
Against this historical backdrop, the NHTSA's most recent propo-
sal, which combines a uniform national safety standard with specific
preemptive language, may indicate a sea change. This proposal would
impose higher safety standards for motor vehicles; specifically, the
proposed rule would require automobile roofs to withstand direct
pressure of two and a half times the vehicle's weight. 50 The NHTSA's
promulgation of a uniform national standard is "part of a comprehen-
sive plan for reducing the risk of death and serious injury from rol-
lover crashes." 51
The proposed rule includes language immunizing car manufacturers
from state tort lawsuits over defective roofs if their cars meet the fed-
eral safety standard: "[I]f the proposal were adopted as a final rule, it
would preempt all conflicting State common law requirements, includ-
ing rules of tort law."' 52 The NHTSA defended the inclusion of an
exemption from state personal injury law on the ground that
carmakers, fearful of lawsuits, would strengthen car roofs to the point
that vehicles would become top-heavy and more likely to roll over.
This would compromise the balance the federal standard sought to
achieve between roof strength and rollover propensity.53
48. Kevin M. McDonald, Federal Preemption of Automotive Recalls: A Case of Too Many
Backseat Drivers?, 71 TENN. L. REv. 471, 484-87 (2004).
49. Id. at 484-85. Courts have reached mixed results with respect to recalls based upon state
law. See id. at 487-88 (reporting an even split among eight courts: "three federal district courts
and one state court have held that the [VSA] preempts state-law-based recall orders"; one fed-
eral district court and three state courts reached the opposite conclusion).
50. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance, 70 Fed. Reg. 49,223,
49,247 (proposed Aug. 23, 2005) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571). This new standard repre-
sents an increase over the one and one half weight ratio currently required. Standard No. 216,
Roof Crush Resistance-Passenger Cars, 49 C.F.R. § 571.216 (1973).
51. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance, 70 Fed. Reg. at 49,224.
The call for national uniformity in safety standards has been echoed by some commentators as
well. For example, in the context of analyzing whether state-based recall orders are preempted
by the VSA, McDonald reasons as follows:
[Sitate-law-based recalls would interfere with the methods by which the federal statute
was designed to reach the goal of promoting vehicle safety .... Potentially fifty differ-
ent notification requirements and differing recall actions, in particular when the
NHTSA has decided not to act, could create the confusion, "undue public alarm," and
harmful economic effects that Congress specifically wished to avoid.
McDonald, supra note 48, at 507-08 (citation omitted).
52. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance, 70 Fed. Reg. at 49,246.
53. Id. at 49,245-46.
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The proposed preemption language has sparked controversy. Sena-
tors Arlen Specter and Patrick Leahy submitted a letter demanding
that the NHTSA explain its broad preemption language in light of the
absence of any express indication by Congress that it intended to pre-
empt state laws in this area.54 For its part, the NHTSA insists this is
not a new phenomenon, citing the situation in Geier, where the agency
joined automakers in arguing that they should not be sued for not
installing airbags at a time when the agency allowed either airbags or
automatic seatbelts. 55
C. Food and Drug Administration
The third tale addresses the FDA, an agency that has historically (if
somewhat inconsistently) asserted the preemptive force of its regula-
tions and is the subject of the most scholarly debate. 56 Housed within
the Department of Health and Human Services, and consisting of
eight separate divisions, the FDA has a broad mission:
The FDA is responsible for protecting the public health by assur-
ing the safety, efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs,
biological products, medical devices, our nation's food supply, cos-
metics, and products that emit radiation. The FDA is also responsi-
ble for advancing the public health by helping to speed innovations
that make medicines and foods more effective, safer, and more af-
fordable; and helping the public get the accurate, science-based in-
54. Specifically, the Senators' letter challenges "how NHTSA concluded that preemption of
State law was the intent of Congress when it passed the Transportation Equity Act" given the
directive of "Executive Order 13132, which states: 'Agencies shall construe, in regulations and
otherwise, a Federal statute to preempt State law only where the statute contains an express pre-
emption provision or there is clear evidence that the Congress intended preemption of State law."'
Letter from Senators Arlen Specter and Patrick Leahy to Jacqueline Glassman, Acting Director
of NHTSA (Nov. 17, 2005). The Senators' letter omits the Executive Order's reference to con-
flict preemption. See infra note 75.
55. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000) ("DOT has explained
FMVSS 208's objectives, and the interference that 'no airbag' suits pose thereto, consistently
over time." (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
28-29, Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995) (No. 94-286); Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae at 7, 11-16, Wood v. Gen. Motors Corp., 494 U.S. 1065 (1990) (No. 89-46)): see
also supra note 46.
56. Professor Robert Rabin provides an illuminating analysis of preemption and the regula-
tory compliance defense (in the pre-2000 era) in the context of FDA regulation of prescription
drugs-the subject matter of the most recent FDA proposal. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory
Compliance, supra note 37, at 2082 (concluding that "the case for a strong regulatory compliance
defense, along the lines envisioned by Peter Huber or Kip Viscusi, is seriously compromised by
real-world considerations"); see also Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law
Meets the Administrative State, 1 J. TORT L. (2006), http://www.bepress.com/jtl; Mary J. Davis,
Discovering the Boundaries: Federal Preemption of Prescription Drug Labeling Product Liabil-
ity Actions (May 22, 2006) (unpublished draft), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=903757.
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formation they need to use medicines and foods to improve their
health. 57
The FDA is often singled out as an exemplar of the ex ante regula-
tory approach.58 It oversees an exhaustive process under the Federal
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) of pre-approval investigation
of new drugs.59 Indeed, "the regulations imposed by the [FDA] are
generally considered the world's most demanding. 60 Thus, the prac-
tice of allowing state tort awards against drug companies whose prod-
ucts have received FDA approval has drawn harsh criticism.61
Preemption under the Medical Devices Amendments (MDA) to the
FDCA was at issue in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.62 Medtronic involved
negligence and strict liability claims by a plaintiff who was injured by a
pacemaker that had been approved by the FDA pursuant to the
MDA. 63 As is typical, and consistent with the NHTSA example
above, neither the statutory language nor the legislative history of the
MDA explicitly bars tort claims.64
57. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA's Mission Statement, http://www.fda.gov/
opacom/morechoices/mission.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2007).
58. See Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 375, 378 (2007).
59. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b), (d) (2000).
60. Joan E. Shreffler, Comment, Bad Medicine: Good-Faith FDA Approval as a Recom-
mended Bar to Punitive Damages in Pharmaceutical Products Liability Cases, 84 N.C. L. REV.
737, 753 (2006) (citing MARK MATHIEU, NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT: A REGULATORY OVER-
viEw 1 (5th ed. 2000)).
61. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A Critique of
Chevron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagareda, 1 J. TORT L. (2006), http://www
.bepress.com/jtl ("What possible reason is there not to preempt litigation which on balance is
worse than useless?"); David R. Geiger & Mark D. Rosen, Rationalizing Product Liability for
Prescription Drugs: Implied Preemption, Federal Common Law, and Other Paths to Uniform
Pharmaceutical Safety Standards, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 395, 396-97 (1996) (contending that tort
liability, subsequent to FDA drug approval, constitutes "retrospective jury nullification" of FDA
regulations and "is contrary to public policy"); W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Phar-
maceutical Litigation: An Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24
SETON HALL L. REV. 1437, 1480 (1994) ("Tort law in the pharmaceutical context has proven to
be an extraordinarily expensive regime that suffers from institutional constraints limiting its ac-
curacy .... [Wihere the manufacturer has complied with the FDCA and its implementing regu-
lations, tort law does not appear to have significant ability to generate safer drugs.").
62. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
63. Id. at 480-81 (describing the expedited premarket notification procedure for "substan-
tially equivalent" medical devices).
64. Congress merely prohibited states from requiring medical device manufacturers to comply
with standards or requirements that are "different from, or in addition to" federal standards. 21
U.S.C. § 360k(a); see, e.g., Robert S. Adler & Richard A. Mann, Preemption and Medical De-
vices: The Courts Run Amok, 59 Mo. L. REV. 895, 923-24 (1994) ("[W]e note that there is no
absolutely dispositive language in the MDA regarding preemption and the common law. That is,
nowhere in the amendments or in the legislative history of the amendments does Congress indi-
cate that state common law tort claims are preempted or are not preempted." (citation
omitted)).
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A sharply divided Court held that common-law claims concerning
the design of medical devices were not preempted: 65 "[P]re-emption
under the MDA does not arise directly as a result of the enactment of
the statute; rather, in most cases a state law will be pre-empted only to
the extent that the FDA has promulgated a relevant federal 'require-
ment.'" 66 The FDA adopted a fairly constricted view of its preemp-
tive power in Medtronic. In fact, the Solicitor General filed a brief in
support of respondent Lohr:
The FDA has consistently, and reasonably, construed the term "re-
quirement" to refer to substantive, but not remedial, provisions.
Applying that approach here, a substantive obligation created by
state tort law, such as the duty to use due care, may constitute a
"requirement" . . . but that term does not encompass a state tort
principle entitling a plaintiff to recover damages for the defendant's
breach of a substantive common-law obligation.67
In other words, the FDA interpreted the term "requirement" specifi-
cally not to preempt state tort remedies or other state remedial provi-
sions; moreover, according to the Solicitor General, this was the long-
standing view of the FDA.68
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee69 pushes in another di-
rection for both the Court and the FDA, with each showing far greater
concern for the potential balkanization of federal regulatory author-
ity. The state common-law claim in Buckman was premised upon al-
legedly false representations made to the FDA in the course of
obtaining approval for orthopedic bone screws. 70 The screws were ap-
proved by the FDA as a predicate device, but the approval was based
on representations that these screws would be marketed for legs and
arms, not spines.71 Claiming that the FDA would not have approved
65. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 493-94.
66. Id. at 496.
67. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents/Cross-Petitioners
at *9-10, Medtronic, 518 U.S. 470 (Nos. 95-754, 95-886), 1996 WL 118035.
68. The Solicitor General pointed to FDA proposed regulations from June 1977. which in-
cluded a preainble that made clear that the preemption provision "does not preempt 'general
State or local law provisions governing the enforcement of requirements applicable to medical
devices,' because '[s]uch general enforcement provisions are not themselves requirements."' Id.
at *12 (alteration in original) (quoting Exemptions from Federal Preemption of State and Local
Device Requirements, 42 Fed. Reg. 30,383, 30,384 (June 14, 1977)).
Following the Medtronic decision, then-Chief Counsel of the FDA, Margaret Porter, agreed
that the Supreme Court's ruling was consistent with the FDA's "long-standing presumption
against preemption." Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and Position,
52 FoOD & DRUG L.J. 7, 7 (1997).
69. 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
70. Id. at 344.
71. Id. at 346-47.
20071
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
the screws absent the fraudulent representation, plaintiffs sought dam-
ages under state tort law. 72
The Solicitor General, in an amicus brief submitted on behalf of
itself, the Chief Counsel for the FDA, and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), took the position that the common-law fraud-on-the-FDA
claims were impliedly preempted.73 In this context, the Government
was not content with the substantive-remedial distinction it had previ-
ously embraced in Medtronic. Instead, the Solicitor General high-
lighted the need for consistency at both the remedial and substantive
ends:
Even if juries in different States applied the same substantive stan-
dards as FDA, it would not eliminate that conflict. As this Court
has explained, "[a] multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of proce-
dures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudi-
cations as are different rules of substantive law." 74
Understanding that "remedies form an ingredient of any integrated
scheme of regulation" 75 -in other words, that remedies cannot be
blithely separated from substantive common-law requirements-is
critical to this view. 76 Moreover, the Court's pro-preemption ruling
retained the essence of the Solicitor General's reasoning:
As a practical matter, complying with the FDA's detailed regulatory
regime in the shadow of 50 States' tort regimes will dramatically
increase the burdens facing potential applicants .... Would-be ap-
plicants may be discouraged from seeking ... approval of devices
with potentially beneficial off-label uses for fear that such use might
expose the manufacturer or its associates ... to unpredictable civil
liability.77
This line of argument is remarkably similar to the FDA's reasoning
in the preemption preamble to its most recently codified rule gov-
72. Id. The suit claimed that the misrepresentations were the "but for" cause of the injuries
that the plaintiffs sustained from the implantation of these devices. Id. at 343.
73. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at *16-18, Buckman
Co., 531 U.S. 341 (No. 98-1768), 2000 WL 1364441.
74. Id. at *23 (alteration in original) (quoting Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers
Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953)).
75. Id. (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)).
76. The FDA attempted to reconcile its seemingly contradictory stance by distinguishing the
areas of "traditional state concern" involved in Medtronic-device design and failure to warn-
from the federal issue at stake in Buckman-fraud. Id. at *19 ("[W]hen state law implicates an
area of preeminent federal concern, the presumption against preemption disappears and the
likelihood of a fatal conflict between state and federal law significantly increases.").
77. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350. Arguably, the Court could have rested its decision exclusively
on an alternate ground: "Policing fraud against federal agencies is hardly 'a field which the
States have traditionally occupied' . . . . To the contrary, the relationship between a federal
agency and the entity it regulates is inherently federal in character because the relationship
originates from, is governed by, and terminates according to federal law." Id. at 347.
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erning the format and content of drug labeling. The final rule, pub-
lished on January 24, 2006 in the Federal Register, includes a
preamble asserting broad preemption of state drug labeling, advertis-
ing, and product liability laws: "[The] FDA believes that under ex-
isting preemption principles, FDA approval of labeling under the act
... preempts conflicting or contrary State law. ' '78
The FDA justified its position on implied conflict preemption in the
interests of uniformity, expertise, and safety concerns:
Given the comprehensiveness of FDA regulation of drug safety, ef-
fectiveness, and labeling under the act, additional requirements for
the disclosure of risk information are not necessarily more protec-
tive of patients. Instead, they can erode and disrupt the careful and
truthful representation of benefits and risks that prescribers need to
make appropriate judgments about drug use. Exaggeration of risk
could discourage appropriate use of a beneficial drug.7 9
Once again, Congress has been silent on the issue of whether state
law may coexist with federal regulatory law in the case of new drug
approvals.80 Does the FDA's action constitute the dawn of a new era
of aggressive regulatory preemption? Not according to the FDA,
which remains emphatic that its preemption preamble is representa-
tive of "the government's long standing views on preemption."'81 But,
78. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Bio-
logical Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314,
601).
At the same time, and injecting considerable ambiguity, the comments to the preamble assert
that the "FDA's regulation of drug labeling will not preempt all State law actions"; specifically,
"certain State law requirements that parallel FDA requirements may not be preempted." Id. at
3936. This "parallel requirements" exception is complicated by the juxtaposition of supporting
and contrary authority cited by the FDA. See id. (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S 470,
495 (1996) for supporting its position that "the presence of a State law damages remedy for
violations of FDA requirements does not impose an additional requirement upon medical device
manufacturers but 'merely provides another reason for manufacturers to comply with . . . fed-
eral law,"' and contrasting the holdings of Buckman, 531 U.S. 341 and In re Orthopedic Bone
Screw Products Liability Litigation, 159 F.3d 817, 824 (3d Cir. 1998)).
79. Id. at 3935. The FDA explains further that, unlike state regulators, the FDA's regulatory
decisions are "characterized by centralized expert evaluation" and would avoid "defensive label-
ing" that would result from disparate state liability regimes. Id.
80. Unlike the MDA, there is no preemption provision at all in the prescription drug provi-
sions of the FDCA. Compare supra note 64, with 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000). There is, how-
ever, a "savings clause." Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76 Stat. 780, 793
(1962).
81. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Bio-
logical Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934. In support of this assertion, the FDA lists three examples
of previous efforts to preempt state law requirements relating to drugs via rulemakings: (1)
preemption preambles included in 1982 regulations requiring tamper-resistant packaging for
over-the-counter drugs; (2) 1986 regulations requiring aspirin labels to include a warning against
use in treating chicken pox or flu symptoms in children due to the risk of Reye's Syndrome; and
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as illustrated above, the consistency and tenacity of the FDA's posi-
tion on preemption over time is subject to dispute.
III. SORCERER'S APPRENTICE?
Congressional intent is at the heart of conventional preemption
analysis. Thus, it would seem that federal agencies, as the bodies to
which Congress delegates statutory authority to carry out its objec-
tives, should naturally have a role. As Professor Einer Elhauge re-
minds us, "in the modern administrative state most statutory
interpretations are done by agencies. '8 2 Until recently, however,
agencies had been more reticent about including forceful preemptive
statements in their regulations. Will the sea change in agency action
have an impact? In order to answer this question, it is first necessary
to wade into the larger unsettled debate regarding the level of defer-
ence courts ought to accord agency preemption determinations-an
issue the Supreme Court has recently taken up. Meanwhile, litigation
implicating the status of the FDA preemption preamble has pro-
ceeded apace in state and federal courts, where there is an emergent
and discernible trend, if not a dominant position, towards deference to
agency preemption determinations. Should this regulatory preemp-
tion trend continue, the implications for what is broadly termed "ac-
cess to justice" are potentially profound. Agencies would be
selectively empowered to act in one direction only-to oust compet-
ing state power-but denied the corresponding power to augment en-
forcement by inferring private rights of action under the regulations
they administer. This asymmetry challenges the conventional view of
the subservient agency acting consistently in the role of "sorcerer's
apprentice."
A. The Stakes of the Agency Preemption Debate
A 1996 Executive Order issued by President Bill Clinton mandates
that a federal regulation "specif[y] in clear language the preemptive
effect, if any, to be given to the law."'83 Why, then, the controversy?
(3) 1994 amendments to regulations related to over-the-counter drug pregnancy-nursing warning
requirements. Id. at 3935.
82. EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 153,
on file with author) ("Because most statutory interpretations today are administrative ones, un-
derstanding the proper justification for, and limits on, the Chevron doctrine is vital to under-
standing modern interpretive practice.").
83. Exec. Order No. 12,988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4729, 4731 (Feb. 7, 1996). Executive Order 13,132,
issued in 1999, instructs agencies to construe federal statutes as preempting state law "only
where the statute contains an express preemption provision or there is some other clear evidence
that the Congress intended preemption of State law, or where the exercise of State authority
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The regulatory preemption debate centers on the extent to which
the preambles go beyond simply reciting the preemptive effect of the
governing statute or regulation promulgated within the agency's dele-
gated authority, and instead attempt to discern the proper scope of
preemption with little or no direction from Congress. 84 Controversy
surrounds the appropriate weight to be accorded agency views:
Should courts grant Chevron deference,85 weaker Skidmore defer-
ence, 86 or no deference at all to agency preemption determinations,
whether embodied in formal rules or informal preamble statements
and agency interpretations? 87 Here, the Court's "presumption against
preemption" canon of interpretation would seem to clash with the
Chevron principle, which accords deference to an agency's reasonable
interpretation of ambiguous laws.88
The Supreme Court has hitherto been rather cryptic regarding
Chevron deference in its products liability preemption decisions; by its
actions, however, it implicitly seems to have granted agency determi-
conflicts with the exercise of Federal authority under the Federal statute." Exec. Order. No.
13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,257 (Aug. 10, 1999).
84. It is beyond peradventure that an agency acting within its delegated authority may pass
legislative regulations that have full preemptive effect. See, e.g., Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982); United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961). It is equally well
settled that Congress may expressly delegate authority to an agency to issue preemptive regula-
tions. The issue here is whether the agency's legal determination regarding the scope of preemp-
tion provisions falls within its delegated power.
85. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
86. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
87. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-28 (2001) (outlining the factors rele-
vant to Skidmore deference, including degree of agency expertise, persuasiveness, and consis-
tency over time and noting that "administrative implementation of a particular statutory
provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to
the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of such authority").
Although she explicitly brackets the issue of regulatory preemption, Professor Nina Mendel-
son argues that courts should have "discretion to take account of an agency interpretation on
preemption under a regime such as Skidmore v. Swift"; she concludes that Chevron deference to
agency preemption interpretations would be ill-advised in part because "[o]ther institutions...
may better assess issues such as the overall distribution of governmental authority and the intrin-
sic value of preserving core state regulatory authority." Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Pre-
emption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 742 (2004).
88. Several commentators have noted this tension:
Deference to administrative rulemaking is normally justified by the presumption that
when Congress has expressed no particular intent on a subject, it meant to leave its
resolution to the agency. The force of that presumption is undercut in the context of
agency preemption, however, by the contrary presumption that Congress does not nor-
mally intend to preempt state law unless it explicitly says so.
Bagley, supra note 7, at 2293-94 (citation omitted); accord Jack W. Campbell IV, Regulatory
Preemption in the Garcia/Chevron Era, 59 U. Prrr. L. REV. 805, 806 (1998); Paul E. McGreal,
Some Rice with Your Chevron?: Presumption and Deference in Regulatory Preemption, 45 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 823, 824 (1995).
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nations a type of Skidmore deference. For example, writing for the
majority in Geier that upheld the preemptive effect of a DOT airbag
regulation, Justice Stephen Breyer appeared to apply Skidmore
factors:
We place some weight upon [the agency's] interpretation of [its reg-
ulation's] objectives and its conclusion, as set forth in the Govern-
ment's brief, that a tort suit such as this one would "stan[d] as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution" of those objectives.
Congress has delegated to [the agency] authority to implement the
statute; the subject matter is technical; and the relevant history and
background are complex and extensive. The agency is likely to have
a thorough understanding of its own regulation and its objectives
and is "uniquely qualified" to comprehend the likely impact of state
requirements.89
The bottom line was that "[i]n these circumstances, the agency's own
views should make a difference." 90
Justice Breyer had previously tipped his hand in a separate concur-
rence in Medtronic:
[T]his Court has previously suggested that, in the absence of a clear
congressional command as to pre-emption, courts may infer that the
relevant administrative agency possesses a degree of leeway to de-
termine which rules, regulations, or other administrative actions will
have pre-emptive effect .... It can communicate those intentions,
for example, through statements in "regulations, preambles, inter-
pretive statements, and responses to comments" ..... 91
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was provoked to respond: "Apparently
recognizing that Chevron deference is unwarranted here, the Court
does not admit to deferring to these regulations, but merely permits
them to 'infor[m]' the Court's interpretation. It is not certain that an
agency regulation determining the pre-emptive effect of any federal
statute is entitled to deference ....
89. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000) (emphasis added) (third altera-
tion in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court relied on the
DOT's explanation in an amicus brief regarding the agency's regulatory objectives and the
agency's bottom-line conclusion that state tort liability would interfere with the accomplishment
of those objectives. Id.; see supra note 46.
90. Geier, 529 U.S. at 883.
91. 518 U.S. 470, 505-06 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Hillsborough County, Fla. v.
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 718 (1985)). In the Court's most recent products
liability preemption decision, Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., Justice Breyer reiterated his
view that the Environmental Protection Agency "ha[s] the legal authority ... to determine the
pre-emptive effect of [its] rules in light of the agency's special understanding of 'whether (or the
extent to which) state requirements may interfere with federal objectives."' 544 U.S. 431, 454
(2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 506 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
92. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 512 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (alter-
ations in original) (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor's opinion was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Id. at 509.
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The issue of what level of deference courts ought to accord to
agency preemption determinations remains unsettled. More precisely,
the issue is whether courts should apply Chevron or some lesser form
of deference to an agency's assertion of preemptive authority-
whether in regulations (legislative, interpretive, or policy) or stated
views (as articulated, for example, in amicus briefs or preambles). 93
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Watters v. Wachovia Bank,
N.A. 94 to decide whether to grant Chevron deference to an agency's
interpretation that its regulation, promulgated under the National
Banking Act, preempts state mortgage lending laws as applied to
wholly owned subsidiaries of a national bank.95
The Watters case appears to have implications beyond the banking
context.96 Indeed, there is a split in authority as to whether the Fed-
93. As Professor Cass Sunstein proclaims, "More than at any time in recent years, a threshold
question-the scope of judicial review-has become one of the most vexing in regulatory cases."
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190 (2006). The issue beguiles courts
and academics alike. See, e.g., City of N.Y. v. FCC, 814 F.2d 720, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
("[W]hether Chevron deference is required in, or appropriate to, judicial review of an agency's
assertion of preemption authority is unsettled."), affd, 486 U.S. 57 (1988) (deferring to the
FCC's decision to prohibit states and municipalities from imposing more stringent standards to
govern cable television signals-without invoking Chevron): Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Ar-
ticle I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097,
2173-75 (2004) (arguing that agency determinations of the scope of their regulatory power
should be given Skidmore, rather than Chevron, deference); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E.
Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001) (proposing a "Chevron Step Zero"
threshold inquiry into whether Chevron framework should apply at all); Cass R. Sunstein, Law
and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2097-101 (1990) (suggesting that
courts have refused to defer to agency determinations of their own jurisdiction when change
implicates "a large category of cases" or when bias or self-dealing is likely to be at work).
94. 126 S. Ct. 2900 (2006), argued, Nov. 29, 2006.
95. Two other federal court of appeals cases raise the same issue:
[T]he Supreme Court has made it clear that a "pre-emptive regulation's force does not
depend on express congressional authorization to displace state law" and that a "nar-
row focus" on Congress' intent to supersede state law is "misdirected." The proper
focus is on whether the agency effecting preemption "has exceeded [its] statutory au-
thority or acted arbitrarily."
Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 314 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154 (1982) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). petition
for cert. filed, 74 U.S.L.W. 3233 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2005) (No. 05-431); accord Wells Fargo Bank
N.A. v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the National Banking Act "pre-
empt[s] the California Commissioner of Corporations'... exercise of investigative and licensing
authority over 'operating subsidiaries' of national banks").
96. Many arguments urged by the parties and amici in Watters apply to preemption questions
outside of the banking context. For example, the petitioner in Watters contends that Chevron
deference to agency preemption determinations is unwarranted "[g]ive[n] the obvious self-inter-
est that undergirds an agency's expansion of its own powers," the Court's capacity to resolve
preemption disputes based on its own "intricate body of law delineating the various types of
preemption," and the effects such determinations would have on federalism. Brief for the Peti-
tioner at 32, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 05-1342 (Sept. 1, 2006), 2006 WL 2570336.
Similarly, an amicus brief submitted by forty-nine states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Colum-
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eral Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) preempts state common-
law claims for design defect and failure to warn against pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturers; this split neatly tracks courts' divergent positions
on the level of deference to accord to the FDA's preemption pream-
ble. 97 In Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc.,98 a federal district court's determi-
nation that the plaintiff's failure-to-warn claims were impliedly
preempted by the FDCA and FDA regulations was in sync with the
FDA's position.99 Emphasizing the centrality of the FDA's view to its
bia argued that granting Chevron deference to such determinations would permit an agency to
"confer power upon itself," thereby raising separation of powers and federalism concerns. Brief
of the States of New York et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner at 7, Watters v.
Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 05-1342 (Sept. 1, 2006), 2006 WL 2570992 (quoting La. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986)). The respondents in Watters replied that "the real
issue is not whether Congress specifically intended to preempt, but instead whether the agency
was authorized to issue the preemptive regulation." Brief in Opposition at 14, Watters v. Wa-
chovia Bank, N.A., 126 S. Ct. 2900 (2006) (No. 05-1342).
97. Although no federal court of appeals has addressed the preemption issue presented since
the FDA issued the preamble, the Third Circuit currently has two cases before it on this very
question. Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 528 (E.D. Pa. 2006), appeal docketed,
No. 06-3107 (3d Cir. 2006); McNellis ex rel. DeAngelis v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ. 05-1286(JBS),
2006 WL 2819046, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2006), appeal docketed, No. 06-5148 (3d Cir. 2006).
District courts are divided on the issue. For pro-preemption rulings that take the position that
the FDA's preamble is entitled to deference, see In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices
& Prod. Liab. Litig., No. M: 05-1699 CRB, 2006 WL 2374742, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006);
Colacicco, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 525; Abramowitz v. Cephalon, Inc., No. BER-L-617-04, 2006 WL
560639, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Mar. 3, 2006); and Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CGC-04-
437382, 2006 WL 2692469, at *6 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Sept. 14, 2006). For anti-preemp-
tion rulings that take the position that the FDA preamble is not entitled to deference, see Jack-
son v. Pfizer, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 964, 968 & n.3 (D. Neb. 2006); McNellis, 2006 WL 2819046, at
*3; Coutu v. Tracy, No. C.A. PC/00-3720, 2006 WL 1314261, at *3 (R.I. Super. May 11, 2006); and
Levine v. Wyeth, No. 2004-384, 2006 WL 3041078, at 32 (Vt. Oct. 27, 2006).
98. 432 F. Supp. 2d 514. The plaintiff in Colacicco sued GlaxoSmithKline because his wife
committed suicide after ingesting a generic version of its antidepressant drug, Paxil. Id. at 518.
The plaintiff asserted a failure-to-warn claim, arguing that the warnings (published by GlaxoS-
mithKline and adopted verbatim by Apotex, the generic manufacturer) regarding suicide risk
were inadequate. Id.
99. The Government's amicus brief, filed at the request of the court, reaffirmed its view that
the plaintiff's failure-to-warn claims were preempted. Brief for Amicus Curiae the United States
of America, at 1, 13, 15, Colacicco, 432 F. Supp. 2d 514 (No. 05-CV-05500-MMB). The Govern-
ment points out that, at least since 2000, the FDA has intervened in pharmaceutical cases, taking
a consistent position that the Supremacy Clause bars state tort liability for failure to include a
warning in a drug label that is in conflict with, or contrary to, warnings approved by the FDA.
Id. at 19 (citing Government briefs filed in Motus v. Pfizer Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004);
Kallas v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 2:04CV0998 PGC, 2005 WL 4030146 (D. Utah Sept. 29, 2005); Bern-
hardt v. Pfizer, Inc., Nos. 00 Civ. 4042 LMM, 00 Civ. 4379 LMM, 2000 WL 1738645 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 22, 2000)).
Courts, moreover, have previously deferred to the FDA's preemption position expressed in its
amicus briefs. See, e.g., Needleman v. Pfizer Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:03-CV-3074-N, 2004 WL 1773697,
at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2004) ("[T]he Court places weight on the FDA's unambiguous statement
that it would view any statement describing a relationship between Zoloft use and suicide as
'false and misleading,' and it would deem any state warning requirement preempted."); Dusek v.
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analysis, the court was prepared to accord Chevron deference to the
FDA's preemption preamble "because Supreme Court precedent dic-
tates that an agency's interpretation of the statute and regulations it
administers is entitled to deference."' 00 A handful of additional
courts have followed suit, according deference to the FDA's preemp-
tion position. 10 1 Given the traction of the Chevron deference position
to date, it is worth considering the implications of this strong form of
regulatory preemption.
B. "Access to Justice"
What, if any, relationship exists, or should exist, between regulatory
preemption and what is broadly termed "access to justice"? It is per-
haps ironic that the stated purpose of Executive Order 12,988-which
calls for specific agency statements as to the preemptive effect of
promulgated regulations-is "to improve access to justice for all per-
sons who wish to avail themselves of court and administrative adjudi-
catory tribunals. 102 To begin, the bedrock of the civil justice system
in the United States is private enforcement. 0 3 Democratic Represen-
tative Jan Schakowsky of Illinois has commented on the recent spate
of preemption preambles:
[1]t appears that there may have been an Administration-wide di-
rective for agencies to promote tort reform through rule
changes.... When so many agencies are understaffed and unable
to enforce existing law, the private right of action is more important
Pfizer Inc., No. Civ.A. H-02-3559, 2004 WL 2191804, at *5 n.7 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2004) ("The
Court does, however, place weight, though not dispositive weight, on the agency's view as ex-
pressed in the amicus brief.").
100. Colacicco, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 525 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Coun-
cil, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)); id. at 529 ("[I]t is abundantly clear that the FDA's position is
entitled to significant deference." (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883
(2000) and Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844)).
101. See, e.g., In re Bextra & Celebrex, 2006 WL 2374742, at *8 ("[The FDA's view of the
preemptive effect of its own regulations is not 'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regula-
tion."' (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)); Abramowitz, 2006 WL 560639, at *4
("While recognizing that the FDA is not a judicial body, this court must respect its decision with
regard to preemption of state claims for failure to warn .... ").
102. Exec. Order No. 12,988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4729, 4729 (Feb. 7, 1996) (emphasis added).
103. See, e.g., Howells, supra note 17, at 308 (contrasting "the European commitment to regu-
lation, rather than, litigation as a means of promoting product safety," with the focus in the
United States on products liability litigation with a more peripheral role for "voluntary stan-
dards[ ] established by private actors"); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities
Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534,
1542-43 (2006) (summarizing research demonstrating that "the majority of the total monetary
sanctions recently imposed in the United States were obtained through private, not public, en-
forcement [of securities laws]"); Issacharoff, supra note 58, at 380-84.
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than ever in ensuring that unsafe practices and products are identi-
fied and kept out of the market.'0 4
Of course, one could separate the establishment of national liability
standards at the federal regulatory level from their enforcement,
which might remain largely in private hands. 0 5 But a darker scenario
lurks in the background. Indeed, taken to an extreme, regulatory pre-
emption, combined with renewed vigor towards evisceration of fed-
eral private causes of action, could lead to a nearly complete
substitution of public for private enforcement of the law. 10 6
Here I wish to press a potentially troublesome asymmetry: agencies
are given significant discretion to interpret or declare the preemptive
scope of the regulations they promulgate, but when it comes to con-
ferring private rights of action under those same regulations, courts tie
their hands. In Alexander v. Sandoval,10 7 the Court rejected the claim
that there was a private right of action to enforce disparate impact
regulations promulgated by the DOJ and the DOT pursuant to Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, on the ground that "[l]anguage in a
regulation may invoke a private right of action that Congress through
statutory text created, but it may not create a right that Congress has
not."108 Here, the Court showed no hesitation in rejecting the agen-
cies' contrary view; it was up front with the fact that "[bloth the Gov-
ernment and respondents argue[d] that the regulations contain rights-
creating language and so must be privately enforceable.' 0 9 Justice
Scalia famously remarked that "[a]gencies may play the sorcerer's ap-
prentice but not the sorcerer himself."'110 The clear import is that
when agencies promulgate rules, private rights of action to enforce
104. Letter from Representative Jan Schakowsky to President George W. Bush (Feb. 16,
2006) (emphasis added), available at http://www.house.gov/schakowsky/PressRelease216 06
BushLetters.html.
105. For example, the securities laws are privately enforced even if under federal regulatory
standards. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 103, at 1542-43.
106. A fuller analysis of the interplay between private rights of action and federal regulatory
schemes is beyond the scope of this Article. Elsewhere, I argue that the necessity of private
rights of action varies inversely with the comprehensiveness of the federal regulatory scheme.
Catherine M. Sharkey, Remedial and Regulatory Voids: Products Liability Preemption in the
Modern Administrative State (2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
107. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
108. Id. at 291 (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 n.18 (1979) ("[T]he
language of the statute and not the rules must control." (alteration in original)).
109. Id. (citing Brief for United States at 19-20, Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (No. 99-1908); Brief
for Respondents at 31, Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (No. 99-1908)).
110. Id. ("[W]hen a statute has provided a general authorization for private enforcement of
regulations, it may perhaps be correct that the intent displayed in each regulation can determine
whether or not it is privately enforceable. But it is most certainly incorrect to say that language
in a regulation can conjure up a private cause of action that has not been authorized by
Congress.").
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those rules will not be available unless the underlying statute meets
the stringent congressional intent requirement of Sandoval."'
Relatedly, the Court has held that where Congress itself has created
a private right of action, it has assigned the primary responsibility for
interpreting the statute to the courts-not the enforcing agency. In
Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett,' 12 a unanimous Court held that the private
right of action expressly conferred on migrant workers under the Mi-
grant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (AWPA) was
not restricted by the exclusivity provisions in the state workers' com-
pensation law. 1 3 The Court, relying on the AWPA's language and
structure, refused to defer to the contrary view expressed in the De-
partment of Labor's regulations. 114 Taken together, Adams Fruit and
Sandoval suggest that, to create or remove private rights of action,
Congress must expressly delegate the power to the agency.' 15
At a theoretical level, there is no disconnect between the realms of
implied preemption and implied rights of action. For each, there is a
similar initial threshold query: Did Congress intend to preempt state
regulations or common-law tort causes of action? Did Congress in-
tend to create a private cause of action to enforce the rights or duties
created by its federal scheme? Why, then, does it seem that the
agency can no longer be distinguished from the sorcerer in the context
of preemption, while it remains a lowly apprentice with respect to im-
plied rights of action? 16
111. To be fair, while the import of Justice Scalia's rhetorical flourish is clear, Sandoval itself
does not tell us much about an agency's power to infer private causes of action, except in the
unusual posture of a valid agency regulation that is utterly inconsistent with the underlying stat-
ute. For an elaboration of this point, see Epstein, supra note 61.
112. 494 U.S. 638 (1990).
113. Id. at 650-51.
114. See id. at 649-50.
115. Professor Thomas Merrill has criticized Adams Fruit as a "wooden product of a concep-
tual scheme that all too often forecloses potentially valuable lines of inquiry." Thomas W. Mer-
rill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 1023 (1992). In contrast,
Merrill argues that courts should defer to agencies which "often have specialized knowledge
about the operations of a particular industry and the way it is affected by a statutory scheme."
Id. at 1022. For an argument that agencies should be granted Chevron deference when deter-
mining whether a private right of action exists, see Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of
Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L.
REV. 93, 159 (2005).
116. Symmetry, of course, could be achieved by restraining the agency in the former context,
as opposed to expanding its authority in the latter. Indeed, not all courts acquiesce in the
agency's assumption of the sorcerer's role in preemption. See, e.g., Desiano v. Warner-Lambert
& Co., 467 F.3d 85, 97 n.9 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[A]n agency cannot supply, on Congress's behalf, the
clear legislative statement of intent required to overcome the presumption against preemp-
tion."); Perry v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d 678, 683 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (suggesting that
the distinction between addressing statutory ambiguities and supplying a legislative statement of
intent to overcome a presumption against preemption is precisely the difference between
2007]
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A finding that no federal private right of action exists will usually
not preclude a state from providing a right of action.1 17 As reflected
in the Restatement (Third) of Torts, "The violation of federal statutes
and regulations is commonly given negligence per se effect in state
tort proceedings."' 18 Most state courts follow suit; as courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction, they recognize that, even absent a federal right of
action, state tort law may provide an enforcement mechanism for the
violation of federal standards.119 But other state courts have refused
to recognize a state tort action based on a violation of the federal
liability standard where there is no express or implied federal cause of
action.120 Courts have relied on various grounds relating to the fact
that "the congressional decision not to provide a private cause of ac-
tion under the [federal statute] becomes quite important in consider-
ing the propriety of a state negligence per se action.' 121 The bottom
line, then, is that there is a right but no private remedy.12 2 Public
enforcement will have to take up the slack.
"play[ing] the sorcerer's apprentice" and "the sorcerer himself' (quoting Alexander v. Sando-
val, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001)).
117. See Note, State Incorporation of Federal Law: A Response to the Demise of Implied Fed-
eral Rights of Action, 94 YALE L.J. 1144, 1155-56 (1985).
118. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14 reporter's cmt.
a (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 4 (1998) ("[A] product's noncompliance with an applicable product safety statute
. renders the product defective .... ).
119. See, e.g., Lowe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 624 F.2d 1373, 1379 (5th Cir. 1980) ("This Court
has often held that violation of a Federal law or regulation can be evidence of negligence, and
even evidence of negligence per se."); Hofbauer v. Nw. Nat'l Bank of Rochester, Minn., 700 F.2d
1197, 1201 (8th Cir. 1993) ("Even though the [plaintiffs] cannot assert a private cause of action
arising under federal law, the federal statutes may create a standard of conduct which, if broken,
would give rise to an action for common-law negligence.").
120. See, e.g., Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 554 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (accepting
defendant's contention that plaintiff's negligence per se claim was impliedly preempted on the
ground "that there is no private right of action under the FDCA"); Miller v. E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 880 F. Supp. 474, 480 (S.D. Miss. 1994) ("This court concludes that since Con-
gress did not intend to create a private right of action under [the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)], then any alleged violation of that statute by defendant cannot
provide a basis for a negligence per se claim."); Dine v. W. Exterminating Co., CIV. A. No. 86-
1857-OG, 1988 WL 25511, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 1988) (holding that "plaintiffs may not invoke
the principle of negligence per se" based on a FIFRA violation).
121. In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 314 (6th Cir. 1988) (observing that "preemption
could be yet another obstacle to plaintiffs' reliance on a theory of negligence per se"); accord
R.B.J. Apartments, Inc. v. Gade City Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 315 N.W.2d 284, 290 (N.D. 1982) ("The
separation-of-powers doctrine and principles of federalism militate against the adoption of the
federal statute as the standard of care in a state negligence action when no private cause of
action, either explicit or implicit, exists in the federal statute.").
122. The Supreme Court has eloquently proclaimed the need for a remedy:
[Tihe power to enforce the performance of [an] act must rest somewhere, or it will
present a case which has often been said to involve a monstrous absurdity in a well
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IV. FEDERALISM VALUES
Agencies' active participation in preemption determinations, fuel-
ing the momentum towards federalization of product liability stan-
dards, raises fundamental issues of institutional choice and
competence. With the stroke of a pen, Congress could definitively an-
swer the question of state common-law preemption in each of the
product areas in which it has regulated. Few would challenge Con-
gress' ultimate constitutional authority in the realm of products liabil-
ity preemption. Indeed, most would argue further that Congress-as
the sole constitutional body that effectively represents state inter-
ests-should exercise its powers to decide critical issues of policy, lest
important federalism values fall by the wayside. 123
The interesting question here, then, is how to handle the situation
presented in each of the product realms examined above where Con-
gress is anything but clear and resolute. Congress punts on the key
question: To what extent do federal "standards" and "regulations"
preempt common-law remedies determined by judges and juries? 124
Agencies and courts, then, vie to fill this interpretive gap.12 5 At this
organized government, that there should be no remedy, although a clear and undenia-
ble right should be shown to exist.
Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 624 (1838).
123. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 331 (2000)
(analyzing the use of nondelegation canons, which require legislative deliberation on the issue in
question on the ground that Congress, not executive agencies, should decide the issue because
state interests are effectively represented in Congress (citing Herbert Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954))). The vigorous dissent in Geier, penned by Justice
John Paul Stevens, and joined by Justices David Souter, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, echoed this view: "Unlike Congress, administrative agencies are clearly not designed
to represent the interests of States, yet with relative ease they can promulgate comprehensive
and detailed regulations that have broad pre-emption ramifications for state law." 529 U.S. 861,
908 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. What explains Congress' failure to weigh in on this critical issue, time and again? Ac-
cording to Professors James Henderson and Aaron Twerski, there is a simple political answer:
Congress quite clearly has sought to placate both industry and consumers by speaking
out of both sides of its mouth. And in the event that no one should understand how
both [preemption and saving clauses] can work in tandem, that job is left to the United
States Supreme Court, which does not have to face the wrath of political constituencies.
JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODucTs LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PRO-
CESS 424 (5th ed. 2004).
This abdication of responsibility, in turn, masks a deeper set of issues regarding Congress'
asymmetric focus on liability standards, rather than remedial schemes, in promulgating federal
legislation-a topic that I take up elsewhere. See Sharkey, supra note 106.
125. Cf. Mendelson, supra note 87, at 800 ("Ultimately, the source of the tension between
Chevron and the presumption against preemption is that Congress has failed to define explicitly
whether it believes a statute preempts state law or whether it wishes an administrative agency to
decide that question.").
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point, the debate shifts to whether agencies or courts are more likely
to protect the values of federalism. 126
Agencies might further federalism values in one of two ways. First,
they might serve as a catalyst for congressional action. Second, agen-
cies themselves might emerge as the institutional actor of choice, to
the extent that they effectively represent state interests in our modern
administrative state. With respect to each of these aims, the "back-
door" nature of federal agencies' recent actions should give us
pause. 127 I take as given that federal agencies are an ingrained com-
ponent of the modern regulatory state. What follows is an attempt to
sketch out a forward-looking, federalism-inspired model for agency
and court participation in preemption determinations.
A. Agencies: Accountability, Dialogue, and Mobilization
Given their unique understanding of the ways in which state law
interacts with a federal regulatory scheme, federal agencies may have
a critical role to play in preemption determinations, either directly or
in forcing Congress to confront the vexing issue of the displacement of
state common law. Recent agency action is in marked contrast with
the pre-2000 era, when, as aptly characterized by Professor Lars Noah,
agencies' formal pronouncements on the preemption subject, typically
disclaiming any preemptive intent, "contributed to the courts' confu-
sion by disavowing any intent to influence tort litigation through
[their] regulatory decisions."1 28 Legal scholar Peter Huber explained
the seeming inconsistency as follows: "Administrative agencies may
find it politically convenient to disclaim final responsibility for [their]
126. The conventional view is that courts, which generally apply a presumption against pre-
emption, are more likely than federal agencies to protect federalism values. But see William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Kevin S. Schwartz, Chevron and Agency Norm-Entrepreneurship, 115 YALE L.J.
2623, 2626 (2006) ("[Aldministrative norm-entrepreneurship is potentially more democratically
accountable than judicial value elaboration."); Mendelson, supra note 87, at 741 (arguing that
"[a]gencies are politically accountable through the President" and also frequently desire to
maintain cooperative working relationships with the states).
127. Others have charged that federal agencies are undemocratic because rulemakings-let
alone the filing of amicus briefs-draw far less public attention than pending legislation. See,
e.g., Theodore Ruger, Left to Their Own Devices, LEGAL AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 24 ("[R]ather
than make its case and risk opposition before elected officials in Congress, the FDA has engaged
in the stealth tactic of intervening in private lawsuits."); Margaret H. Clune, Stealth Tort Reform:
How the Bush Administration's Aggressive Use of the Preemption Doctrine Hurts Consumers 10
(Ctr. for Progressive Regulation White Paper No. 403, Oct. 2004) ("The Bush Administration
has pursued its tort reform agenda through arcane legal vehicles that are largely hidden from
public view, and it has enlisted the industry to alert it to chances to do so.").
128. Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in Products
Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147, 2158 (2000) (citing regulations).
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public risk choices .... "129 This point was taken up by Noah, who
suggested that the FDA historically failed to oppose judicial review of
agency standards because the tort system served as a convenient
"safety valve" for deflecting adverse publicity when FDA-approved
products were subsequently demonstrated to be defective. 30 Might
then the recent promulgation of preemption preambles by federal
agencies mark the dawn of a new sense of accountability?
Agency accountability, however, means more than seizing the pre-
emption reins. In filling out Congress' statutory schemes, agencies are
called upon to judge how the continuation of state laws alongside fed-
eral legislation might skew congressional objectives. 131 This evalua-
tive process does not take place in a vacuum. Agencies are "subject to
a combination of political influences by the executive, legislature, and
outside political groups.' 32 Indeed, "agencies have become an im-
portant situs for the expression and testing of public norms."'1 33
At least in theory, there should be room in this process for a fed-
eral-state dialogue. Under Executive Order 13,132, federal agencies
are obliged to consult with state and local authorities regarding the
129. Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the
Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 334 (1985).
130. See Noah, supra note 128, at 2158.
131. In this vein, the Medtronic Court focused upon the FDA's expertise:
Because the FDA is the federal agency to which Congress has delegated its authority to
implement the provisions of the Act, the agency is uniquely qualified to determine
whether a particular form of state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," and, therefore, whether
it should be pre-empted. For example, Congress explicitly delegated to the FDA the
authority to exempt state regulations from the pre-emptive effect of the MDA-an
authority that necessarily requires the FDA to assess the pre-emptive effect that the
Act and its own regulations will have on state laws.
518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996) (citations omitted).
132. ELHAUGE, supra note 82 (manuscript at 154) (citing Elena Kagan, Presidential Adminis-
tration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2254-60, 2264-69, 2274-319 (2001)). Elhauge's current prefer-
ences default rule theory provides an illuminating angle on the debate. Elhauge takes the
position that "agencies in fact are subject not only to presidential influence but to various forms
of influence by Congress and outside political groups." Id. (manuscript at 172). Elhauge pro-
vides a significant caveat:
If agency action can largely be directed by the President, then its actions are more
likely to reflect only presidential preferences. Such agency action is more likely to take
positions that create sharp conflicts with Congress. More importantly, such agency ac-
tion is less likely to reflect current enactable preferences because the President's views
reflect only one piece of the political puzzle necessary to create enactments.
Id. (manuscript at 173).
133. Eskridge & Schwartz, supra note 126, at 2624-25 ("Administrative norm-entrepreneur-
ship through statutory interpretation can enrich our national discourse about fundamental
values.").
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effects of the regulations they issue.134 The CPSA specifically pro-
vides for cooperation between the Commission and state agencies, in-
cluding the commissioning of state employees as CPSC officers for
purposes of conducting examinations, investigations, and inspec-
tions.135 The NHTSA and the FDA are likewise directed to foster
open exchanges with state and local agencies. 136
But the recent controversy over the agency preemption preambles
has led to charges that agencies are thumbing their noses at these con-
gressional and executive mandates. In its recent Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking on roof standards, the NHTSA asserted that the new rule
"would not have any substantial impact on the States," and therefore
did "not have sufficient federal implications to warrant consultation
with State and local officials or the preparation of a federalism sum-
mary impact statement. ' 137 The FDA, at the time of its December
2000 initial notice of its intent to revise the prescription drug labeling
regulations, stated its view in the preamble that its regulations were
minimum standards and did not preempt state tort claims.' 38 Moreo-
ver, the FDA expressly stated that "this proposed rule does not con-
tain policies that have federalism implications or that preempt State
law."1139 The FDA's issuance of a final rule with preemptive language
inserted in the preamble thus provoked charges that it had flouted its
obligation to consult with State and local authorities and circum-
vented the proper notice-and-comment process.
The question remains, however, whether the aggressive pro-pre-
emption posture taken by the agencies (coupled perhaps with their
134. See Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,257 (Aug. 10, 1999) (requiring agen-
cies to provide notice and opportunity to participate to potentially affected states); see also Geier
v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 909-10 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stressing the
significance of notice-and-comment rulemaking to "ensure that States will be able to have a
dialog with agencies regarding pre-emption decisions ex ante").
135. See 15 U.S.C. § 2078 (2000) (requiring Commission to "establish a program to promote
Federal-State cooperation" by commissioning state and local authorities to assist in "data collec-
tion, investigation, and educational programs" so long as states and localities are "able and will-
ing to provide [such services] and, if so agreed, may pay in advance or otherwise for the
reasonable cost of such assistance").
136. See, e.g., FDA INVESTIGATIONS OPERATIONS MANUAL 71 (2006) ("The scope of con-
sumer protection is extended by cooperative efforts of federal, state, and local agencies and
international cooperation. Procedures to appropriately share responsibilities and cooperate with
our consumer protection partners are essential. Federal, state, and local cooperation shall be
fostered whenever possible.").
137. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance, 70 Fed. Reg. 49,223,
49,245 (proposed Aug. 23, 2005) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
138. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Prescription Drugs and Bio-
logics; Requirements for Prescription Drug Product Labels, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,082, 81,103 (pro-
posed Dec. 22, 2000) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201).
139. Id. (emphasis added).
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flouting of these mandates) will nonetheless serve as a catalyst to mo-
bilize congressional action. 140 A group of state attorneys general and
the National Conference of State Legislatures have voiced sharp criti-
cisms of the preemption preambles issued by the NHTSA and the
FDA;141 Oregon Governor Theodore Kulongoski has joined the cho-
rus of protest.142 The American Trial Lawyers' Association (recently
renamed the American Association for Justice) has used the issue to
energize its base; 143 the issue nearly came to a head at the 2006 annual
meeting of the American Bar Association. 144 Public Citizen, a con-
140. Here, I am drawing upon Professor Roderick Hills' provocative argument in favor of a
strong presumption against preemption not based on the merits of the anti-preemption position,
but instead upon the hypothesis that it will serve as a catalyst for mobilizing the public and
generating bills before Congress, which would then be forced to confront the issue directly. See
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legisla-
tive Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). As a theoretical matter, however, one could
employ either a strong pro- or anti-preemption default (or presumption) for court decisionmak-
ing. Noah, for example, has hypothesized that agency preemption, in the form of a regulatory
compliance defense enforced by courts, raises all parties' incentives to take part in agencies'
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. Noah, supra note 128, at 2164 n.71. Ultimately, it
is an empirical claim whether one or the other default position would lead to greater mobiliza-
tion of the public, leading to some congressional action. Here, I merely trace some of the actors
prompted into action in response to courts' actual (or predicted) deference to agency preemp-
tion preambles.
141. See Letter from Office of the Attorneys General of Twenty-Six States to NHTSA (Dec.
23, 2005) (criticizing the NHTSA's alleged flouting of the specific mandates of Executive Order
13,132); Letter from National Conference of State Legislatures to the Secretary of the U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services (Jan. 13, 2006), available at http://www.ncsl.org/pro-
grams/press/2006/060113Leavitt.htm (assailing the FDA's actions as "an abuse of agency process
and a complete disregard for our dual system of government") see also Federal Preemption of
State Authority a Disturbing and Growing Trend, NCSL NEWS, Apr. 6, 2006, http://www.ncsl.org/
programs/press/2006/prO60406.htm.
142. See Rob Ammons & David George, Tort Reform by Regulation: The National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration Attempts to Preempt State-Tort Lawsuits with Its Proposed Roof-
Strength Regulation, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 709, 729 n.144 (2006) ("Oregon Governor Theodore R.
Kulongoski objected to NHTSA's claim that Proposed Safety Standard 216 does not raise suffi-
cient federalism concerns to warrant consultation with state officials of a federalism summary
impact statement." (citing Letter from Governor of Oregon Theodore R. Kulongoski to Jacque-
line Glassman, Acting Administrator of NHTSA (Nov. 21, 2005), available at http://dmses.dot
.gov/docimages/pdf94/372927_web.pdf)).
143. ATLA's President Kenneth Suggs has accused the FDA of underhandedness, given the
lack of transparency in its rulemaking process. Suggs, supra note 4, at 9 ("The final rule is the
polar opposite of the one that was originally proposed .... The FDA even admitted at a January
press conference announcing the rule that the provisions were added behind the scenes after
consulting with the drug industry.").
144. Reacting to what it perceived as a "silent tort reform" movement, the Tort Trial and
Insurance Practice Section of the American Bar Association House of Delegates proposed, but
then subsequently withdrew, the following resolution: "That, absent Congressional authoriza-
tion, the American Bar Association opposes the promulgation by federal agencies of rules or
regulations that pre-empt state tort and consumer protection laws in instances where the state
laws hold parties to a higher or stricter standard than that being promulgated by a federal
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sumer advocacy group, has pressed opposition to preemption in court
as well as in the press.1 45
This agitation, moreover, has reverberated throughout the cham-
bers of Congress. Senators Edward Kennedy and Christopher Dodd,
and Representatives Sherrod Brown, Henry Waxman, and John
Dingell voiced angry criticism of the FDA for its failure to comply
with its consultation mandate. 46 And Senator Kennedy and Repre-
sentative Maurice Hinchey have threatened to introduce legislation if
necessary to thwart the agency's preemption coup.1 47
In sum, the issuance of preemption preambles might galvanize a va-
riety of stakeholder groups-including those representing states and
the public interest-to take responsive action, including lobbying
Congress for legislation to address preemption explicitly. Courts' def-
erence to agency preemption determinations might then serve as a
strong pro-preemption default, leading to mobilization of interests
before Congress. But in light of Congress' track record to date, it is
worthwhile to consider whether courts might play a different sort of
information-forcing role in a world where Congress, even in the face
of increased agitation, continues to punt on the key preemption
determination.
B. Courts: Penalty Defaults and Information-Forcing Rules
Given the twin aims of mobilization and robust exchanges between
federal agencies and state and public stakeholders, courts, too, might
play an enhanced role. Consistent with Executive Order 13,132,148
courts might condition deference to agency interpretations of the pre-
emptive scope of regulations on compliance with various congres-
agency." Sandra R. McCandless, 2006 A.B.A. TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. SEC. 1; Leigh Jones,
Plan Causes Sharp Divide Before Being Pulled, NAT'L L.J., July 31, 2006.
145. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Public Citizen et al., Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F.
Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (No. 06-3107) (pending appeal in the Third Circuit); Allison M.
Zieve & Brian Wolfman, The FDA's Argument for Eradicating State Tort Law: Why It Is Wrong
and Warrants No Deference, 21 Toxics L. REP. 516 (2006); FDA's Drug Label Rule Fails to
Guarantee Access to Vital Information and Includes "Sneak Attack" on Patients' Legal Rights
(Jan. 18, 2006), http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/print-release.cfm?ID=2114.
146. Letter from Senators Edward M. Kennedy and Christopher J. Dodd to The Honorable
Michael 0. Leavitt, Secretary of Health and Human Services (Feb. 23, 2006); Letter from Repre-
sentatives Sherrod Brown, Henry A. Waxman, and John D. Dingell, members of the House
Committees on Government Reform and Energy and Commerce, to The Honorable Michael 0.
Leavitt, Secretary of Health and Human Services (Feb. 23, 2006).
147. See John P. Lavelle, Jr. & Anne G. Sweeny, Preemption of Failure-to-Warn Claims: The
Battle Inside and Outside the Courtroom, 14 METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Oct. 2006, at 25.
148. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 10, 1999). The Executive Order does
not give rise to any rights enforceable in court, so it is controversial to suggest that courts give
dispositive weight to any failure to comply with its mandates.
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sional and executive measures designed to increase the public
participation of states, the legislature, and outside political groups:
consultation mandates, "federalism impact statements," or even no-
tice-and-comment periods could be required for all preemption state-
ments. An express declaration of preemptive intent and effect in the
required federalism impact statement,'149 for example, might be a pre-
requisite to court deference to an agency interpretation of the pre-
emptive scope of a particular regulation.15 0 In a similar vein, courts
might mandate notice-and-comment periods for any preemption state-
ment. 151 The goal of such procedural reforms would be to require
the agencies to engage directly with the preemption issue, leading to
more deliberate, well-informed, and publicly accountable decision-
making. 152
Some recent cases illustrate such a hard-line stance taken by courts.
In Jackson v. Pfizer, Inc. ,153 a federal district court rejected the defen-
dant's claim that common-law failure-to-warn claims were preempted
by the FDA. In so doing, the court opined that "[t]he recent notice
issued by the FDA claiming preemption is not persuasive" on the
ground that "[t]he FDA failed to comply with its requirements [under
Executive Order 13,132] to communicate with the states and to allow
149. Id. at 43,258.
150. As Mendelson documents, currently it is rare in practice to see federalism impact assess-
ments from agencies. Mendelson, supra note 87, at 783. A 1999 GAO report corroborates this
observation, finding that "agencies have prepared federalism assessments for only 5 of the more
than 11,000 final rules issued in recent years" and otherwise only include "'boilerplate' certifica-
tions with little or no explanation of why the executive order's requirements were not applicable
to the rules." U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERALISM: IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE
ORDER 12612 IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 8, 11-13 (1999) (suggesting that agencies' high
thresholds for what constitutes a significant federalism impact explain this phenomenon).
151. Interpretive rules and statements of policy, however, are ordinarily exempted from the
APA's notice-and-comment procedure. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
Policy statements are "issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in
which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power." Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 197
(1993) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281. 302
n.31 (1979)). It is not obvious whether the preemption preamble is an "interpretive rule" or a
"statement of policy." See, e.g., Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 532-34 (2006).
152. Notice-and-comment rulemaking is at the heart of many scholars' embrace of adminis-
trative statutory interpretation. See, e.g., ELHAUGE, supra note 82 (manuscript at 165) ("While
different forms of rulemaking have equally coercive effects on third parties, it is only rulemaking
that is conducted after notice and comment that gives some reasonable assurance that the agency
surveyed the current political preferences before acting."); Eskridge & Schwartz, supra note 126,
at 2626 (describing the notice-and-comment process as "[i]llustrating a republican virtue absent
in judicial norm elaboration, citizens and groups are able to present their evidence and argu-
ments to public officials who are required to take their input seriously").
153. 432 F. Supp. 2d 964 (D. Neb. 2006). The plaintiffs in Jackson sued Pfizer and Wyeth for
strict liability and negligence, alleging that ingestion of the antidepressant drugs Zoloft and Ef-
fexor caused their son to commit suicide. Id. at 965.
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the states an opportunity to participate in the proceedings prior to a
preemption decision. ' 154 In similar fashion, the federal district court
in McNellis ex rel. DeAngelis v. Pfizer, Inc.155 refused to defer to the
FDA's assessment of the preemptive effect of its rule based not only
upon its failure to comply with Executive Order 13,132, but also on
the ground that "the 2006 Preamble was a novation, not subjected to
prior public notice or comment. ' 156
Each of these courts refused to accord mandatory Chevron defer-
ence to the agency's statement of its preemption position in a pream-
ble that in some way evaded the procedural process for agency
rulemaking.' 57 By conditioning deference (whether of the mandatory
Chevron variety, or more plausibly, of the Skidmore "power to per-
suade" variety) on full compliance with the congressional and execu-
tive mandates designed to ensure robust dialogue and debate among
state and federal stakeholders, courts would force agencies, at a mini-
mum, to account for any divergence between their stated purposes to
promote uniformity and enhanced safety, and the consequences flow-
ing from evisceration of state common-law causes of action.
V. CONCLUSION
Agency preemption preambles represent the latest manifestation of
a broader trend of the increasing federalization of law governing
products regulated in a national market. This inexorable momentum
towards federalization raises a potentially troublesome asymmetry
with respect to agency decisionmaking: courts appear to grant agen-
cies expansive discretion to interpret or declare the preemptive scope
of the regulations they promulgate, whereas agencies are not given
corresponding latitude to infer private rights of action under those
154. Id. at 968 & n.3 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 10, 1999)). The
court likewise declined to give the FDA's amicus briefs "force of law." Id. at 968 n.4. The
Supreme Court has held that, in order to get Chevron deference, agency action must have the
"force of law." Mead, 533 U.S. at 229-31.
155. No. Civ. 05-1286(JBS), 2006 WL 2819046, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2006), appeal docketed,
No. 06-5148 (3d Cir. 2006).
156. Id. at *9 ("While an agency's explanatory statement, composed after receiving comment
upon the duly-published proposed regulations, is admittedly not itself subject to notice and com-
ment before final publication, the abrupt rejection of the agency's own prior interpretation
(while the regulations themselves are unchanged) suggests a degree of informality yielding an
interpretation unhinged from the text and original intent of the regulations themselves.").
157. But see In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., No. M: 05-
1699 CRB, 2006 WL 2374742, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006) ("[T]he FDA's failure to comply
with Executive Order 13132 regarding consultation with local officials about a possible conflict
with state law does not mean that this Court cannot consider the FDA's view of how certain
state laws stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the objectives of Federal law.").
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same regulations. Moreover, the "backdoor" nature of recent agency
action is in sharp tension with the conventional notion of a democrati-
cally accountable, broadly representative body (e.g., Congress) taking
the lead in politically charged areas that implicate the balance of fed-
eral-state relations. To transcend these various difficulties, I have
sketched some court-enforced default rules that might alternatively
mobilize Congress to address preemption questions directly or else
motivate agencies to replace Congress as the situs for a rich and delib-
erative debate surrounding the displacement of state common law by
a federal regulatory scheme. In a world where Congress is likely to
continue to punt key preemption questions to agencies and courts, it is
worth considering such federalism-inspired models, designed to foster
an informed dialogue amongst the institutional actors. The goal here
is not that such information-forcing reforms would inevitably lead to
substantive policy changes within the agencies,15 8 but instead that they
would shed light on what has hitherto been an all-too-quiet, backdoor
movement, in need of further scrutiny and debate.
158. Of course, an agency "high on hubris" (to quote from Robert Rabin's oral commentary
on this Article) could easily evade any such requirements with "empty symbolic gestures."
Moreover, the politics involved in this area are significant. Cf. Anna Wilde Mathews, FDA Plan
Would Aid Drug Makers in Liability Suits, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2006, at Al ("Inclusion of the
new FDA policy in the long-awaited drug-labeling rule has sparked disagreements between FDA
career officials and Bush administration appointees, according to people with knowledge of the
matter. Some FDA career staffers have argued internally that it isn't relevant to the rule's focus
on drug-labeling reform, and may draw controversy to an important regulatory improvement
that isn't itself politically divisive.").
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